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A concern with teams was central to early attempts to grasp the nature of the firm, but 
fell out of favor in later work. We encourage a return to the emphasis on teams, but 
argue that the idea of teams as central to the nature of the firm needs to be grounded in 
an appreciation of the importance of We frames and group agency. We use converging 
insights from evolutionary anthropology, cognitive social psychology and work on team 
agency to develop such a grounding, and link it to the issues of the existence and 




INTRODUCTION: BRINGING TEAMS BACK INTO THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
What is the nature of the firm? According to a once prominent stream of research in the economics 
of the firm (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Holmström, 1982; Alchian, 1984; Kandel & Lazear, 1992) 
the fundamental nature of the firm lies in “team production,” specifically, in the firm being a team of 
heterogeneous, but complementary resources where precisely measuring the marginal product of 
each input factor is difficult. However, in the economics of the firm literature, the team production 
emphasis has largely been supplanted by an emphasis on specialized assets and investments and the 
under-investment threats and ex post haggling problems they may give rise to (Hart, 1995; 
Williamson, 1996).   
In this article, we argue for a return to the emphasis on team production and management for 
team production as lying at the core of our attempts to understand why firms exist and what explains 
their boundaries and their internal organization. Teams are a basic form of human cooperation with 
an impressive evolutionary past. Recent work in management and economics broadly asserts that 
firms increasingly organize around teams of strongly complementary human resources (Lepak & 
Snell, 1999). This is manifest in two ways. First, the boundaries of firms shrink so that the services 
of less strongly complementary resources are sourced from other firms (Rajan & Zingales, 2000, 
2001; Lippman & Rumelt, 2003). Second, the basic organizational unit is increasingly becoming the 
team/project/group (rather than the department or division) (Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). Thus, teams 
should be central in our attempts to understand the emerging nature of firms. However, we argue that 
the understanding of what teams are should to go substantially beyond the narrow understanding of 
the economics of the firm. We also argue that an understanding of teams informed by converging 
advances in the understanding of teams in fields and disciplines, such as management, psychology 
research, evolutionary anthropology and game theory (e.g., Sugden, 2000, 2003; Kozlowski & Bell, 
2003; Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson, & Jundt, 2005; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 
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2005), has the potential to significantly further our understanding of the key issues in  the theory of 
the firm.  
The team production stream was an attempt to answer the key explananda in the theory of the 
firm, as defined by Coase (1937) concerning existence, boundaries and internal organization of firms 
The team production stream focused on team production because it served to highlight three 
fundamental features of the theory of the firm: 1) gains from trade stemming from complementarities 
among heterogeneous resources, 2) team technologies that may function as covers for moral hazard, 
and 3) governance mechanisms (specifically, a monitor-residual claimant) that internalize the 
externalities stemming from 2). In the pioneering contribution to this stream (i.e., Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972), Coase’s explananda were addressed in terms of internalizing externalities from team 
production (the firm’s existence), team production (which defined the scope/boundaries of the firm), 
and monitoring and residual claimancy in the context of a nexus of contracts (internal organization).  
Formal representations of these ideas utilize non-cooperative game theory in which, crucially and 
true to the original contributions (e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), team members’ strategies do not 
include the goals of other team members or indeed the team itself (Holmström, 1982; Kandel & 
Lazear, 1992).  
We revisit teams as an essential part of firm organization, but we do so from a perspective that 
is very different from the older team literature in economics. Fundamentally, the latter does not do 
justice to what it means to engage in productive activities in a team (Gold, 2005). In particular, 
economics approaches to teams neglect the fundamental fact that members of a well-functioning 
team are motivated to achieve a common goal and that they choose actions and activities in order to 
realize this goal (a point that is better captured in economics in Marschak and Radner [1972] team 
theory, as well as in management research, e.g., DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010). In situations 
where players have some degree of common interest and their strategies are strongly complementary, 
they may be primed to team-identify and adopt a We frame in their strategy choice (Bacharach, 
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2006). Work in evolutionary anthropology suggests that human beings are especially equipped with 
cognitive and motivational faculties that are dedicated to such identification and to the framing of 
their strategy choices (Tomasello et al., 2005). Apparently, our social brains (Dunbar, 2003) contain 
a hardwired ability to recognize a situation one that involves team efforts, and to trigger the special 
motivational and cognitive faculties to participate in these efforts (cf. Sebanz, Bekkering & 
Knoblich, 2006). However, motivation for such team-oriented efforts is highly precarious and a team 
situation may degenerate into the prisoners’ dilemma predicted by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), 
indicating that the latter situation is a special case. 
We argue that there are far-reaching implications of these ideas for our fundamental 
understanding of firms and other organizations (see also Lindenberg and Foss 2011). Specifically, 
these ideas speak directly to the issues of coordination and motivation that constitute the core of the 
economics of the firm. However, they are difficult to frame in the context of the established tools of 
economics and game theory. Accordingly, we explicate the differences between the notions of teams 
in the sense of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and the understanding of teams in the sense of jointly 
working on the realization of common goals with a We frame and the specific motivation this entails. 
We call this motivation “team motivation,” and see it as a subset of the broader set of pro-social 
motivations.
1
 We also discuss recent game theoretical ideas that seem fruitful for treating the latter in 
a more formal manner, mainly the ideas of Bacharach (2006) and Sugden (2000, 2003; Gold & 
Sugden, 2007) as they pertain to team agency. We finally link these ideas to the classical questions in 
the theory of the firm, that is, the existence and boundaries of the firm. While markets are not 
necessarily inconsistent with conditions of cooperation in teams (Bruni & Sugden, 2008), firms can 
generally provide conditions that are conducive to team motivation at lower cost. However, we argue 
that as firms grow, it becomes increasingly difficult to uphold the special motivation for cooperation 
in teams, so that there are limits to the scope and size of firms.  
                                                          
1
 Note that we divorce this entirely from ethical considerations. Thus, a group of mafia members may exhibit team 
motivation. Team motivation, also called  “joint production motivation” (Lindenberg and Foss 2011) can apply to any 
kind of group that endeavors to realize common goals, legitimate or not. 
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TEAMS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Two classical works on teams were published in 1972, namely Marschak and Radner’s (1972) “team 
theory” approach and Alchian and Demsetz’ (1972) emphasis on “team production.” Both gave rise 
to different research streams within the then emerging economics of the firm, namely the team 
theoretical stream and what Williamson (1985) calls the “measurement approach” (roughly equal to 
agency theory).  
 These two contributions characterize teams very differently and identify very different 
problems of team organization. Thus, Marschak and Radner define a team as “an organization the 
members of which have only common interests” (1972: 9). They study “… the case in which several 
persons perform various tasks including those of gathering and communicating information and of 
making decisions; but they have common, not divergent, interests and beliefs. Hence the optimality 
requirement is easily defined, just as in the case of a single person. But the single person’s problem 
of optimizing his information instrument and its use [i.e., non-cooperative game theory] is replaced 
by that of optimizing the allocation of tasks among the members of a team” (Marschak & Radner, 
1972: 4). Thus, team theory assumes that team members have common goals so that it is as if the 
team is maximizing its expected net payoff.  
 Alchian and Demsetz define teams indirectly, namely as a group of individuals who are 
engaged in “team production,” that is, “… production in which 1) several types of resources are used 
and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource … [and] … 3) not 
all resources used in team production belong to one person” (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972: 779). Team 
production involves super-additivities (or, “synergies”), and will be used when the productivity gains 
(relative to the “sum of separable production”) can “cover the costs of organizing and disciplining 
team members.” Famously, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) link minimizing these costs to the existence 
of a specialized monitor who assumes the role of residual claimant. Hence, the emergence of the 
“classical capitalist firm.” The elegance of Alchian and Demsetz’s explanation is that it 
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simultaneously explains the existence, boundaries and internal organization of firms in exceedingly 
simple terms (too simple, as it turned out).  
  Marschak and Radner (1972) has enjoyed limited attention, in spite of some attempts to 
revitalize this research stream (e.g., Bolton & Dewatripont, 1994). The theory of the firm became 
pre-occupied with incentive conflicts and their potential efficiency losses, and how such conflicts 
may be partly remedied by contractual and governance means (for a historical account, see Foss & 
Klein, 2011). This left little or no room for the interest in the structure of common interest games that 
occupied Marschak and Radner. In contrast, the Alchian and Demsetz (1972) paper enjoyed massive 
initial attention, and is sometimes seen as the founding contribution to the “positivist” (as distinct 
from the “formalist”) branch of agency theory (Jensen, 1983). While the paper is still seen as a 
classical and seminal contribution, its emphasis on moral hazard in a team production is, however, 
not regarded as a necessary ingredient in the theory of the firm. Alchian himself later explicitly 
denied that team-production “is a necessary ingredient in the theory of the firm” (Alchian, 1984; 




 Perhaps because the Marschak and Radner approach never became a major analytical force in 
the theory of the firm and the Alchian and Demsetz (1972) analysis was abandoned as a foundational 
part of the theory of the firm, the emphasis on teams largely disappeared from the focus of theorists 
of the firm. To be sure, these contributions are still cited, and empirical (e.g., Drago & Garvey, 1997) 
and experimental work (Grosse, Putterman & Rockenback, 2009) continues to be carried out, but the 
last major theoretical contributions on teams (in the Alchian & Demsetz tradition) are Holmström 
(1982) and Kandel and Lazear (1992).
3
   
                                                          
2
 For example, there are shortcomings with respect to its treatment of authority (Williamson, 1985), its lack of 
applicability to diversified firms and its failure to explain why the monitor couldn’t be an employee of a firm specialized 
in producing monitoring services (Hart & Holmström, 1989).  
3
 Holmström (1982) shows that in a team setting there is no sharing rule that can simultaneously satisfy the criteria of 
Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality and budget balance. This “impossibility result” is used to explain the separation of 
ownership and control in the modern corporation.  
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 We propose a return to the concern with teams as critical in the context of human cooperation, 
including the theory of the firm (see also Lindenberg and Foss 2011). We accept Alchian and 
Demsetz’ basic characterization of team production, that is, productive activity that involves 
heterogeneous but complementary resources, a high degree of task and outcome interdependence, 
and the potential for super-additive outcomes. We also accept Marschak and Radner’s (1972) 
characterization of a team as a group of agents with a common goal that can only be achieved by an 
appropriate combination and coordination of the individual activities of the group members. 
However, we agree with Blair and Stout (1999: 267-8) that earlier analysis in economics has “… 
sidestepped some of the most interesting … questions about teams, including: What are the sources 
of the economic surpluses in team production, and how can they best be harnessed and directed?”  
 As we shall argue addressing the “most interesting questions about teams” requires that we 
abandon the “non-cooperative” emphasis on individual utility maximization and moral hazard 
(whether or not it is tempered by invocations of “team spirit” [Alchian & Demsetz, 1972] and “peer 
pressure,” Lazear & Kandel, 1992). But it also requires that we break with the team theory 
assumption that individuals in teams always have common goals. What is needed is the recognition 
that individuals may adopt team goals (intentions) or individual goals (intentions), and that what they 
adopt depends on the extent to which the relevant goals are prompted and maintained by the team 
itself or by circumstances outside of the team. In turn, recognizing this requires that we think of the 
possible precariousness of the adoption of team goals and thus also of the close interrelation between 
cognition and motivation, both of which aspects are virtually absent in extant research. To gain 
additional insight we need to take a look at what other fields, inside and outside of economics, have 
had to say about team production and its governance and organization (in a broad sense). 
TEAMS: REASONING AND MOTIVATION 
What Other Fields Tell Us About Cooperation in Teams 
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Teams and team production are basic kinds of social organization that have existed since the 
first small hunting bands of homo sapiens roamed the savannas of Africa many millennia ago. Work 
in evolutionary anthropology suggests that evolution made groups of humans capable of overcoming 
the free-rider problem in a different way than that proposed by Alchian and Demsetz. The argument 
is that human beings are especially equipped with cognitive and motivational faculties that have 
evolved to facilitate participating in productive activities in teams (Tomasello et al., 2005). These 
faculties created the adaptive advantage of human beings living in larger groups, and the neocortex 
evolved as a “social brain” to allow primates and especially human beings to draw adaptive 
advantages from living in such groups (Dunbar, 2003).  
Studies of perception and action in social contexts indicate that the brain contains an ability to 
perceive and recognize a situation as one that involves a team effort. Moreover, this recognition 
triggers specialized, coordinated cognitive faculties that are attuned “to make common cause” 
(Sebanz, Bekkering & Knoblich, 2006). Thus, members of a team oriented towards team goals 
literally perceive the environment differently than in independent action: they recognize a team 
endeavor and see themselves as part of this endeavor, each with their own roles and responsibilities, 
involving a sharing of cognitions about the relevant tasks, interdependencies, timing, and possible 
obstacles to smooth coordination in terms of joint goals. They are able to mutually anticipate goal-
related actions from others and to cognitively coordinate temporal and special aspects of cooperation 
(Higgins & Pittman 2008; Sebanz et al., 2006). They exert intelligent and adaptive efforts, and are 
willing to supply inducement and assistance to others to make them do their bit (Tomasello et al., 
2005), and sanction them if they do not (Ostrom et al., 1992).  
As Grosse, Putterman and Rockenbach (2009: 2) argue, the Alchian and Demsetz team 
situation is an example of the kind of problems that have been studied by experimental economists as 
public goods games. A general finding within this literature is that individuals voluntarily contribute 
to public goods (Zelmer, 2003), and incur costs to punish free riders (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). The 
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interpretation often is that individuals hold social preferences and derive utility from behaving pro-
socially (Fehr & Falk, 2002). However, such preferences seem to be context-dependent (Tversky & 
Simonson, 1993). Moreover, they seem insufficient to prevent decay of cooperation over time, unless 
they are supported by flanking arrangements (Ledyard, 1995).  
 Reviewing the evidence on game-theoretic studies of cooperation, Ledyard concluded that “… 
it is possible to provide an environment in which almost all of the subjects contribute toward the 
group interest. … Why … this all works remains a mystery” (Ledyard, 1995: 172).  Apparently, 
situations exist that may somehow prime individuals to adopt group goals, and choose actions in 
terms of those goals. Those situations include contributing to public goods and choosing effort levels 
in a team production situation. However, as Ledyard suggests it is far from clear what is going on in 
terms of the dynamics of framing and motivation. Extant literature presents two (partly overlapping) 
explanations, namely team reasoning (Bacharach, 2006; Sugden, 2003; Gold & Sugden, 2009) and 
goal-framing (Lindenberg, 1998, 2006). The first one highlights rational deliberation, while the other 
highlights bounded rationality and more automatic mental responses brought about by cues in the 
environment.  
What’s Going On? Reasoning About What to Do In a Team 
Finding game-theoretical answer to Ledyard’s question is made difficult by the fact that game 
theory and economics at large only take the team as a context for the realization of agent’s own 
goals; thus, actions are never deliberated upon and chosen in terms of group goals. The main 
exception to this claim is represented by the work of Michael Bacharach (2006) and Robert Sugden 
(2000, 2003; Gold & Sugden, 2009), partly drawing on earlier work by philosophers such as Gilbert 
(1999) and Tuomela (2005).  
Bacharach’s fundamental concern is with modes of practical reasoning, that is, reasoning that 
leads to prescriptions about what an agent should do, given what he seeks to achieve. The practical 
reasoning of standard game theory proceeds in terms of an “I frame” (Tuomela, 1995), framing each 
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player as asking, “What should I do in terms of strategy choice, given that I wish to maximize my 
utility?” Bacharach developed a series of examples based—provocatively—on the “Hi-Lo game.” 
This is an asymmetric common interest game (e.g., in the two player case, it may have (2,2) and (5,5) 
in the main diagonal and (0,0) and (0,0) in the other one).  
Clearly, intuition (as well as theoretical argument, e.g., Crawford & Haller, 1990) suggests that 
coordination on the Pareto optimal equilibrium is particularly trivial here; more so than in, for 
example, the closely related stag-hunt game. However, Bacharach argues that classical game theory 
is in general not capable of demonstrating―in terms of practical reasoning―how players can choose 
strategies that jointly lead to Pareto optimal outcome (rather than the Pareto-inferior one).  Rather, 
classical game theory is concerned with consistency requirements. Thus, statements such as “if every 
player believes everyone else to choose actions that are consistent with equilibrium (somehow 
specified), then they have valid reasons to choose those actions” are not statements about the 
reasoning process that leads to those valid reasons, but statements about the end results of such 
processes. Bacharach’s argumentative strategy seems to be that if individual reasoning leading to I-
intentions cannot lead to the optimal outcome in the “obvious” situation of the Hi-Lo game, then this 
holds for more complicated games (e.g., the stag-hunt game) a fortiori.  
Now, real-world players clearly have little difficulty finding the optimum outcome in Hi-Lo 
games (Crawford & Haller, 1990). Bacharach’s answer is that this is because real world players 
reasoning about games such as the Hi-Lo game, in fact, do not adopt reasoning that proceeds in term 
of I-intentions. On the contrary, they adopt what (Sugden, 2003) calls “team reasoning,” adopting 
“team preferences” (Sugden, 2000), leading to the formation of a We frame. Team reasoning entails 
practical reasoning about what we should do as a group to further our goals. An important aspect of 
team reasoning as a mode of practical reasoning is that it generates action recommendations that are 
less conditional on what the individual believes about the actions (and reasons for actions) of other 
individuals (see Sugden [2000] and Bacharach [2006] for complications). Specifically, when a team 
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adopts a We frame and engage in team reasoning, the underlying game form is transformed so that 
instead of having payoffs defined for each participating individual, there is a single scalar for any 
combination of strategies which represent the team payoff for this combination—which bridges the 
gap between practical reasoning and equilibrium outcomes.  
The main part of the argument is the concern with valid reasoning from certain premises (i.e., 
the adoption of an I or a We frame). This is also the rational, deliberative part. Bacharach does not 
argue that the choice of a frame is an intentional act. Rather, he argues that the We frame is highly 
functional in certain situations and environments, and that it has been produced by evolutionary 
selection (forging a link to evolutionary anthropology). Certain features of a game prime individuals 
to adopt a We frame (Bacharach, 2006: 165-166).  Specifically, priming factors are the degrees of 
“common interest” and “strong interdependence” in the game. Common interest ranges from zero 
sum games (in which there is zero common interest) to (symmetrical) coordination games in which 
there is no conflict of interests at all, and includes games with some conflicting interests (as in the 
battle-of-the-sexes game) (see also Zizzo & Tan, 2009). Common interest will, however, only prime 
a We frame in a team if the team is currently in a less-preferred state, but is able to move the 
preferred state by means of team action. This will be the case when the game exhibits strong 
interdependence, so that only a combination of actions by team members will be able to realize the 
preferred state of the team. 
Clearly, the PD game possesses the feature of common interests and strong interdependence.  
However, Bacharach does not naïvely claim that these features invariably leads to cooperation in the 
PD game. In in such a game “… players might see only, or most powerfully, the features of common 
interest and reciprocal interdependence which lie in the payoffs on the main diagonal. But they might 
see the problem in other ways. For example, someone might be struck by the thought that her co-
player is in a position to double-cross her by playing [defect] in the expectation that she will play 
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[cooperate]. This perceived feature might inhibit group identification” (Bacharach, 2006: 169). The 
question when players will see the game in one way or another is left unanswered. 
What’s Going On? Team Motivation and Goal Framing Theory 
  Bacharach and Sugden’s work on We and I frames, team reasoning and so on represent 
important strides forward in aligning our knowledge about teams in an evolutionary context with 
game theoretical thinking. However, it does less to identify the motivational mechanisms at work. In 
particular motivation seems entirely endogenous to cognition (e.g., adopting a We frame reframes 
the payoffs of a game) and, hence, not worthy of a distinct treatment. Moreover, the theory presents 
little detail about what may prompt changes between I and We frames. It seems to impose a strict 
either-or status of these frames; that is, a player is either fully in an I or a We frame, and there is 
apparently no recognition that one of these frames may be in the cognitive foreground while the 
other stays in the cognitive background.
4
 A further problem is that it does not explicitly treat the 
phenomenon that support for a We frame may decay unless it is scaffolded by extra arrangements 
(Andreoni, 1988; Fehr & Gächter, 2002).  Finally, Bacharach and Sugden do not seem to allow for 
the simultaneous existence in the mind of individuals of multiple goals.  
 In contrast, cognitive social psychology goes further with respect to identifying these crucial 
motivational details of the We frame and team agency. In particular ,goal-framing theory is 
concerned with the motivational force of collective orientations, such as those implied by We frames 
and team reasoning. It suggests that there is a distinct kind of motivation that is particularly geared to 
collaborative activities in teams. How this works is explained by goal-framing theory (Lindenberg 
2008, Lindenberg & Foss, 2011).
5
  
                                                          
4
  However, Bacharach (2006) allows for “circumspect team reasoning” in an attempt to capture the possibility that some 
players may be in an I frame while others are in a We frame which analytically may have similar consequences. 
5
 Such motivation is distinct from “pro-social motivation” (e.g., Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin & Schroeder, 2005; Benabou 
& Tirole, 2008) because the latter does not require that individuals interact in a team, adopting team reasoning. Sugden 
(2008: 402) hints at this when he criticizes one of the experiments in Colman, Pulford and Rose’s (2008) for failing to 
discriminate between pro-social motivation and team reasoning.  
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 Goal-framing theory applies the insight from (social) cognition research that mental constructs 
have to be activated in order to affect behavior, and that goals are particularly important mental 
constructs in which cognitions and motivations are intricately intertwined (e.g., Förster, Liberman & 
Higgins, 2005; Kruglanski & Köpetz, 2009). There are also overarching goals, More concretely, 
gGoals, and particularly overarching goals, govern what we attend to (Posner & Petersen, 1990); 
what concepts and what kinds of knowledge are being activated; what alternatives we consider; what 
information we are most sensitive about; what we expect others to do, and how we process 
information (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Förster, Liberman & Higgins, 2005; Kruglanski & Köpetz, 
2009). In turn, these cognitive processes have an impact on motivation by inhibiting other goals 
(Shah, Friedman & Kruglanski, 2002); by influencing what we like and dislike (Ferguson & Bargh, 
2004); and by governing the criteria we use to judge goal realization or failure (Carver & Scheier, 
2002). 
There are different overarching goals (Lindenberg and Steg 2007) and when they are focal (i.e., 
when they are activated at the moment), they “frame” a situation by steering important cognitive 
processes in their service. In their competition for the privilege of being focal (i.e., for being a “goal-
frame”) they try to inhibit each other (Brewer, 2004).  There are overarching goals concerning 
individual interests (hedonic and gain goals, see below). But, importantly, one overarching goal is 
connected to a supra-individual orientation, called a normative goal, and it may be characterized by 
the desire “to act appropriately” in the service of the supra-individual entity be that a dyad, group, 
organization, or nation (Moorman & Blakely, 1995; Van Knippenberg, 2000).
6
 The criteria for goal 
fulfillment are linked to the realization of joint goals and to meeting joint appropriateness standards. 
When the normative goal is focal, the two competing individual interest goals are pushed into the 
cognitive background. This suspends opportunism to various degrees, as illustrated by the finding 
that people act very differently in terms of cooperation when they identify a situation (i.e., the exact 
                                                          
6
 Note that the normative goal frame has its dark side: It can stifle creativity and create Yes Men if there is no 
accountability and the normative goal frame supports sub-group egotism and thereby leads to fragmentastion (see 
Lindenberg & Foss [2011] for details). 
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same prisoners’ dilemma game) as a “community game” or a “Wall Street game” (Liberman, 
Samuels & Ross, 2004; see also Pillutla & Chen, 1999).  
There is a variant of the normative goal that is directed at cooperation in a team rather than just 
at a focus on appropriateness (norms) and/or collective identification and a feeling of We.  
Bacharach (2006) suggests that inherent features of the underlying game (e.g., strong 
interdependence) may be enough to bring this special team motivation about; however, as we will 
argue, more is needed to bring this motivation about and to maintain it. Importantly, the normative 
goal is easily pushed into the background by the individual interest goals, unless it is strongly 
supported by features in the environment (see Keizer, Lindenberg & Steg 2008). Strong 
interdependence, though an important ingredient, is not sufficient to support the normative goal (let 
alone the team cooperation variant of the goal) against the competition of individual interest goals. 
What exactly are these competing goals?  
One overarching individual interest goal, called the gain goal, is directed at maintaining or 
improving their resources (e.g., status and money). When it is focal, the criteria for goal realization 
pertain to improvements in these resources. A gain goal-frame makes individuals highly sensitive to 
opportunities for and threats to the improvement of their resources, and thus particularly sensitive to 
incentive instruments. For example, in such a goal-frame individuals will react strongly to 
advancement schemes, are willing to invest in education if returns are reasonably certain, will be 
competitive with regard to advancement, and may act opportunistically (Williamson, 1985). Since 
the normative goal is pushed into the background, group goals and norms are seen as constraints to 
be reckoned with when furthering one’s own career, income, or status, rather than as guiding 
principles for appropriate action.  
The other individual interest goal, called the hedonic goal, is directed at improvement of the 
way one feels at a particular moment, such as seeking direct improvement in self-esteem, seeking 
excitement, and avoiding unpleasant effort, negative thoughts and events, and uncertainty. The 
15 
 
criteria for having realized the goal relate to improvements in the way one feels. The power of this 
goal-frame vis-à-vis rival goal-frames derives from its direct link to emotions (Ryan, Huta & Deci, 
2008). A hedonic goal-frame makes individuals oriented towards instant gratification in different 
domains.
7
 For example, if a particular cue makes a person hedonic with regard to one aspect (say 
having fun) the fact that it is an overarching goal will also make that person hedonic with respect to 
many other aspects (such as impatience in financial transactions).
8
 
Both these individual interest goals are formidable competitors for the normative goal unless 
they can be harnessed to support the normative goal from the background. The recognition of this 
precariousness of the normative goal-frame may be the most important ingredient for understanding 
firms and other organizations emerging from goal framing theory. It has direct and concrete 
consequences for the way governance structures that create and maintain the motivation for 
cooperating in teams could possibly be constructed (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011), but also for the 
theory of the firm itself. 
TEAMS AND THE EXISTENCE AND BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRM 
Bacharach (2006) explicitly wanted to examine the implications of his specific approach for the 
understanding of organizations, but unfortunately died before he
 
could accomplish that task, and 
what is left from his hand does not go beyond team-theoretic (in the sense of Marschak & Radner) 
considerations (e.g., see Bacharach, 2001). Lindenberg and Foss (2011) apply the insights from goal 
framing theory to governance structures, especially reward design and structural design (i.e., key 
aspects of the internal organization of firms). But they do not address the implications of this theory 
                                                          
7
 A recent experiment (Van den Bergh, Dewitte & Warlop, 2008) illustrates this point. One group of (male) subjects was 
exposed to photographs of young women in bikinis, the other was not. Subsequently both groups were engaged in a 
completely different experimental task about impatience in monetary transactions. The exposure to the bikini women 
made subjects (at least temporarily) much more impatient in monetary transactions, even though the latter were not 
directly related to the former.  
8
 Goal framing theory focuses on the three substantive goals just described. Other overarching goals, such as 
approach/avoidance or leaning/performance goals found in the literature are not rival to this approach, but can differ 




for the other aspects of the theory of the firm: the existence and boundaries. In the remainder of this 
article, we will address these issues.  
The conventional approach in the economics of organization is to begin from potential gains to 
trade from transactions between independent parties, ask why these gains cannot be fully realized in 
the context of market organization, and tell a story about how shifting these transactions to a firm 
mode of organizations makes it possible to create joint surplus that cannot be realized under 
alternative governance structures. We will follow this explanatory heuristic in the following; 
specifically, we ask why only firms can succeed on a sustained basis in fully realizing the joint 
surplus that team motivation brings about. 
Our claim that only the firm governance structure can succeed on a sustained basis in fully 
realizing the joint surplus that team motivation brings about is admittedly controversial. As Frey, 
Luethi and Osterloh (2011) show, “community enterprises” such as opensource software production 
and Wikipedia, are not firms, but are built on a high team motivation. However, the crucial 
difference between open source networks and firms is that in the latter, there is a fixed membership 
whereas in the former members self-select in and out. This means that for open source networks, the 
problem of overstretching the size of the team does not occur. What would create malfunctioning in 
the firm due to loss of team motivation in the conglomerate does not happen in the network due to 
flexible self-selection. The implication is that such networks can have a competitive advantage 
compared to fixed membership teams. But it also seems clear that they are not suited for every kind 
of jointly produced good.  
Note also that we do not argue that firms always and everywhere arise to safeguard the 
particular motivation to engage in team-related activities and that this uniquely explains their 
boundaries. Rather, we assert that realizing the joint surplus that team motivation brings about 
provides one reason why firms exist and one explanation of their boundaries (other, complementary, 
reasons are economizing on bargaining costs [Coase, 1937; Wernerfelt, 1997] or protecting specific 
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investments, Hart, 1995; Williamson, 1985). Not all firms necessarily realize team motivation. And 
firms with few obvious team features, such as conglomerates, certainly exist. Thus, firms can 
certainly exist although they are very poor at mobilizing and sustaining team motivation. However, 
we assert that such firms cannot reach the levels of joint surplus that are available to those firms that 
do succeed in mobilizing and sustaining team motivation (cf. also Osterloh & Frey, 2001). For 
example, while conglomerates consists of, in some cases, thousands of heterogenous teams, and 
while productive conflict between competing teams can be imagined, such creative heterogeneity 
and competition thrive best when individuals are embedded in an overall team context with real input 
and output interdependencies between units. Conglomerates cannot as a rule provide such a context. 
Thus, our theory is as much a theory of successful firms as it is a theory of economic organization. 
To see this, we need to consider team motivation and its consequences in greater detail. 
Team Motivation and Its Consequences for Joint Surplus 
The introduction of team motivation casts the understanding of the surplus from team 
production in a novel light. Two issues need consideration, namely, first, the efficiency yardstick that 
is used in assessing surplus, and, second, the sources of the additional surplus that team motivation 
yields.  
With respect to the first issue, the economics of the firm applies notions of first- and second-
best efficiency (Hart & Holmström, 1989; Hart, 1995; Laffont & Tirole, 2001). Such efficiency 
yardsticks are defined relative to given preferences. Framing seems to have no explicit role to play in 
thinking about efficiency. However, in terms of goal-framing theory, the economics of the firm in 
actuality assumes that individuals are always and everywhere in the gain-goal frame, and its 
contribution lies in unfolding the manifold consequences for our understanding of contracts and 
governance structures and mechanisms of this assumption. Notions of first and second-best are 
therefore always implicitly defined taking this goal-frame the one that obtains. The introduction of 
the normative goal-frame and its sustenance of team motivation changes the understanding of 
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efficiency. Thus, the point is not that if employees hold a normative goal frames they are capable of 
reaching and sustaining the value maximizing outcome that is defined for a situation in which 
employees are in a gain goal-frame (as in repeated game approaches to organizations; e.g., Kreps, 
1990). Rather, in the normative goal-frame they can reach payoffs that they cannot reach in a gain 
goal-frame, even with repeated games. What are the sources of this additional economic surplus?  
Team motivation has beneficial organization-level consequences because it impacts the tasks 
that organizational members are willing to engage in; how much effort they will put into these tasks; 
and how they coordinate their actions. It is also associated with pro-social behaviors, such as 
spontaneous sharing of knowledge (De Dreu et al., 2008), which, in turn, may positively impact 
work productivity and innovation performance (Tsai, 2001). It involves the heedful interrelating that 
has been found to assist coordination in ambiguous situations (Weick & Roberts, 1993) and to 
promote innovation performance (Dougherty & Takacs, 2004). As it implies a partial suspension of 
moral hazard/opportunism, it reduces the need for costly control mechanisms (Podsakoff & 
McKenzie, 1997). Coordination costs are reduced because team motivation implies that 
organizational members generate shared representations of actions and tasks in terms of joint goals, 
reducing the need for planning and formalization. Individual efforts are channeled towards the 
realization of common goals.  
These are consequences of the normative goal-frame and the team motivation it may give rise 
to when individuals perceive a situation as one that has team characteristics. Because individuals 
who are in a normative goal frame engage in fundamentally pro-social activities that they do not 
engage in when in the gain goal frame (and may choose higher levels of effort), the first best under 
team motivation is higher than the first-best as described in economics of the firm. The difference 
may be called “team motivation rents,” that is, those rents that arise when team members are in the 
normative compared to the gain goal frame. Because the theory of the firm assumes that individuals 
are always in the gain goal frame, it is too pessimistic with respect to what can be achieved by 
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human cooperation. And it arguably also misses out on important aspects of what explains the 
emergence and boundaries of the firm (on internal organization, see Lindenberg & Foss, 2011).  
The Existence of the Firm in the Light of Team motivation 
Explaining how firms emerge (i.e., what explains their existence) from the perspective of team 
reasoning and team motivation requires that we explain what we mean by a “firm.” We here adopt 
the definition that a firm is “a coalition of interspecific resources owned in common and some 
generalized inputs, whose owners are paid, because of difficulty of output measurability according to 
some criteria other than directly measured marginal productivity, and the coalition is intended to 
increase the wealth of the owners of the inputs by producing salable outputs” (Alchian, 1984: 275).  
This is not only a commonsense definition, but also one that harmonizes with the team notion, 
because of its emphasis on the firm as a “coalition of interspecific resources … and generalized 
inputs.” It is also a definition which is sufficiently broad to also include, for example, partnerships 
because it avoids defining the firm in terms of the employment contract (in contrast to Coase, 1937). 
We have already summarized Alchian and Demsetz’ (1972) theory of why firms in this sense 
should arise from the “inseparability” feature of team production. As we have seen, their theory 
proceeds solely in terms of I intentions. In a pertinent discussion, Williamson (1985: 240) adds his 
focus on asset specificity to Alchian and Demsetz “separability” issue in order to highlight the 
importance of the zone of acceptance in employment contracts (an issue deliberately sidestepped as a 
non-issue by Alchian and Demsetz). Williamson describes a move from commercial contracts with 
separable inputs to employment contract with inseparable inputs, where procedures of internal 
organization, such as grievance procedures, job security, etc., keep the zone of acceptance intact. The 
need for such procedures, he says, is “…especially great where members of the team develop 
idiosyncratic working relationships with one another, in which case no single member can be 
replaced without having disruptive effects on the productivity of the unit. More complex teams in 
which mutual motivation and internal monitoring are encouraged are apt to take shape in such 
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circumstances” (Williamson, 1985: 244). Williamson (1985: 247) also notes that the “…firm will 
engage in considerable social conditioning to help assure that employees understand and are 
dedicated to the purpose of the firm.” In sum, the prediction is that transactions that are characterized 
by inseparability and a high degree of asset specificity are best matched with the dedicated 
governance machinery that firms are best able to realize.  
We concur with this overall conclusion, but do so for reasons that differ from Williamson’s. 
Williamson hints at the problem of how to establish and maintain team motivation, that is, the 
simultaneous cognitive and motivational coordination among actors, and suggests that firms may 
particular advantages in dealing with this. However, the specific measures that he argues that firms 
can uniquely leverage do not seem particularly compelling. For example, why exactly would 
grievance procedures and job security safeguard create and safeguard team motivation? The problem 
seems to be that Williamson’s approach, like the economics of the firm in general, is fundamentally 
dyadic (i.e., the relations that are considered are those between the individual employee and the firm) 
and based on I intentions, and the measures he considers are dyadic ones. Thus, the recognition that 
team motivation (which Williamson would seem to recognize) requires a specialized structure does 
not appear in Williamson’s work.   
A reason why firms may arise, then, is because cooperating agents realize that sustaining team 
motivation and thus the rents from such motivation requires the deployment of organizational 
instruments that are dedicated to this task.
9
 In Alchian and Demsetz’ (1972) original paper team 
production is associated with synergies (i.e., super-additivities) deriving from the underlying 
technology, but the resulting team production rents are threatened by the potential for shirking that 
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 This is obviously a functionalist account. However, it is possible to build causal-genetic accounts of the emergence of 
firms from a team motivation perspective. Thus, teams may form spontaneously, or they may be put together by an 
entrepreneur who perceives an opportunity in doing this (Harper, 2008). Bacharach (2006) suggests that the 
characteristics of common interest and strong interdependence (cf. our earlier discussion) are conducive to team 
reasoning, but by the same token they may be seen as conditions facilitating the emergence of teams (Harper, 2008: 618-
619). Indeed, as Bacharach (2006: 165-166) points out, these characteristics prompt “… the parties to see that they have 
action possibilities which provide joint agency possibilities which have possible outcomes of common interest … Some 




team production introduces, and require supporting arrangements in the form of the allocation of 
decision and income rights that characterize the “classical capitalist firm” (ibid.). While the rents 
from team motivation are conceptually distinct from team production rents, they, too, are fragile and 
need supporting arrangements. The fragility of team motivation synergies stems from the 
precariousness of the normative goal frame. Relative goal strength matters to what goals will come to 
dominate cognitive processes. Importantly, in the absence of supporting arrangements the normative 
goal-frame is the weakest of the three goal-frames. From an evolutionary point of view, it makes 
sense that hedonic goals and gain goals have a default priority as basic needs are expressed by 
hedonic goals and caring for one’s own resources (i.e., the gain goal frame) is vital for adaptive 
advantages. The relative weakness of the normative goal can also be gleaned from the fact that even 
if the normative goal is focal at a given moment, it tends to decay quite quickly unless it is 
strengthened by supporting arrangements, such as positive and negative sanctions (Andreoni, 1988; 
Ledyard, 1995; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Thus, absent supporting arrangements, one of the two 
“individualistic” goals (hedonic and gain) is likely to displace the normative goal-frame. What are 
these supporting arrangements and why are they particularly likely to be associated with firms rather 
than markets (cf. Foss, 1996)?  
Lindenberg and Foss (2011) point to organizational and work design, and argue that a first 
important condition is that clearly perceptible interdependences within and across team boundaries 
must be part of the attention structure of the firm (Ocasio, 1997). The clearer the common goals, the 
various roles in which individuals help to reach those goals, and the functional connections of tasks 
and goals between different levels of the firm, the easier it is for employees to develop and sustain 
team motivation.
10
 Even if common goals are specified in the task and team design, they must still be 
embedded in a shared sense of common direction and affect at the level of the firm. This will also 
help prevent subunit egoism. A suitable means for achieving a common direction is a vision and 
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 Note that although classical organization theory (e.g., March & Simon, 1958) also stress the important coordinating 
role of shared knowledge and the importance of clear goal, this is not related to team motivation. 
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mission statement, consensually supported by top management, that focuses on a common purpose 
rather than on operational goals that are appropriate for the task and team structure.  
Employees need to be rewarded individually in a contingent manner so as to maintain their 
motivation to engage in certain activities. However, contingent rewards, such as status advancement 
and monetary rewards, can foster a gain goal frame. In turn, contingent hedonic rewards, such as 
enjoyable tasks and better offices, can foster a hedonic goal frame. In both cases, the normative goal 
frame will be weakened and and intelligent effort will be selectively driven by what leads to personal 
rewards (hedonic or gain) rather than by what contributes to the realization of common goals (Frey & 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Lindenberg, 2001; Meyer and Gupta 1994; Milgrom and Roberts 1988). 
Contingent rewards, particularly rewards that are modest enough to keep gain and hedonic goals in 
the background, are needed. Instruments such as financial (bonuses, extra pay), career (promotion), 
personal development (empowerment), symbolic (honors), or enjoyable task rewards; bigger offices; 
company cars; and expense accounts should remain modest (compared to noncontingent rewards) 
and should be explicitly given as recognition of one’s contribution to cooperative efforts in the team. 
Negative sanctions (financial or symbolic) for not contributing are likely to be legitimate in a team 
context and will strengthen the normative goal frame, provided the behavior can be monitored 
correctly (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003). Recognition must still be linked to some kind of 
measurement, which is often difficult in team contexts (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). However, when 
organization and team design is calibrated to support team motivation, efforts will be more easily 
observable because goal setting, plans, and agreements provide multiple information sources on 
individual performance.  
The Boundaries of the Firm in the Light of Team Motivation 
A persistent theme in the explanation of firm boundaries has been that complementarities 
between actions or investments play a key role in shaping these boundaries. Thus, actions are highly 
complementary in Alchian and Demsetz’ (1972) team production theory, and modern property rights 
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theory (Hart, 1995) stress the importance of complementary investments. However, under market 
conditions virtually all sharing rules (Holmström, 1982) give rise to inefficient effort or investment 
levels. Firm boundaries and the structure of property rights they imply reflect attempts to maximize 
such efforts/investments.  
In the team motivation view, complementarities are also crucial, but for a different reason than 
those stressed in the above theories. As we argued above, team motivation is bounded by the 
cognitive and motivational forces created a structure that is easily recognized as combining 
individual inputs and individual intelligent efforts in a synergistic manner. When firms get 
increasingly large, this unity will be lost due to the fact that the objective structure will be less 
integrated and especially because the subjective ability to perceive jointness is limited to clear 
structures of functional interdependence. Also, increasing informational distance, difficulties of 
maintaining commitments, and problems of calibrating incentives accompany the increase in the size 
of the firm. These problems mean that team motivation becomes increasingly difficult to uphold. 
Moreover, growth may be associated with a combination of common purpose rhetoric with 
simultaneous strategic shifts to gain goal-frame instruments (such as special bonuses and, for extra 
flexibility, selective withdrawal of measures that protect the employment contract).  This does not 
only weaken the team motivation, it also amounts to selective intervention (which, as Williamson 
(1985) has observed, works with physical but not with human assets) (Foss, 2003).  
CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed a return to the concern with teams that characterized the theory of the firm in its 
period of inception in the early 1970s. This is partly prompted by an observed return to teams as the 
core of firm organization. This is often argued to be driven by globalization and the liberalization of 
financial and other markets (which tend to shrink the boundaries of the firm; cf. Rajan & Zingales, 
2000, 2001), and by advances in information and telecommunication technologies, cost accounting 
and measurement (which makes teams and projects more viable inside the corporate boundaries; cf. 
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Zenger & Hesterly, 1997), as well as by the increasing knowledge content in production (which 
tends to promote cooperative decision-making among groups of peers; cf. Adler & Heckscher, 2006). 
However, recent advances in game theory, cognitive psychology, and evolutionary anthropology 
have highlighted this special motivation that, under the right conditions, may support cooperation in 
teams (Gold, 2005) and may contribute to the observed tendency for team-based organization. The 
integration of these ideas with the extant theory of the firm is a huge, but not forbidding, task. The 
main barrier is that the economics of the firm is formulated in terms of I intentions, whereas we have 
highlighted the importance of We intentions, and the specific kind of motivation that accompanies 
such intentions in a team setting. It is, however, possible to align this collective focus with much of 
the received theory of the firm, such as its focus on discriminating alignment (Williamson, 1985).   
Thus, we proffer the construct of team motivation and argued that it provides novel insight into 
the “sources of the economic surpluses in team production, and how … they best [can] be harnessed 
and directed” (Blair & Stout, 1999: 267-8). This allowed us to sketch where a focus on team 
motivation advances our understanding of the existence and boundaries of the firm, namely by 
directing attention to the specific organizational arrangements that need to be deployed to safeguard 
team motivation rents. These arrangements cannot be supplied by the market, partly because 
authority is required to deploy and administer them, and partly because they are opposed to the focus 
on the gain goal-frame and the need for high-powered incentives that are necessary for the market 
(Williamson, 1985).  
From a team motivation perspective, firms arise to safeguard team motivation and its attendant 
rents, and their boundaries reflect this. It is surely possible to interpret this in standard terms: 
although team motivation resides in individuals individual (Bacharach, 2006), it only works if it is 
simultaneously in all employees, and in a coordinated way. In order to achieve this, a specific 
organizational design is required. And the specific asset that needs protection is then the specific way 
in which the firm’s organizational design supports team motivation. However, it is worth repeating 
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that the economic theory of the firm has no role for team production, and therefore does not raise the 
issue of how organizations can be designed to sustain it. Firms that succeed in deploying the 
organizational flanking arrangements that call forth and sustain team motivation will create more 
value than those firms that do not. In other words, our theory is potentially a theory of heterogeneity 
and differential corporate success (which the extant theory of the firm is not).  
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